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A
mid falling revenues and impending budget shortfalls, state       
policymakers must find ways to increase revenue, cut spend-     
 ing, or both. At the same time, they must develop policies that 
attract or keep businesses and jobs. Some policymakers may consider 
raising corporate tax rates because it avoids directly taxing workers who 
are already suffering the effects of this recession. But as states reevaluate 
their current tax policy, it is important to consider the effects of each 
tax component. One important question is: Who will bear the burden 
of the taxes? 
State corporate income taxes are complex, and thus the answer to 
this question is far from obvious. Many believe that the state corporate 
tax structure is highly progressive because the corporate capital taxed is 
owned disproportionately by wealthy individuals. In today’s economy, 
however, the burden of the corporate tax may have shifted to consum-
ers or labor, resulting in a less progressive tax structure. 
Research has shown that in some cases labor bears a substantial 
weight of the corporate tax. While this burden has fluctuated over time, 
the relationship between corporate taxes and wages has been consis-
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tently negative. In other words, higher corporate taxes are typically as-
sociated with lower wages. 
This article examines the impact of state corporate taxes on wages. 
The first section of the article discusses the evolution of the state cor-
porate tax. The second section explores who bears the burden of the 
tax. The third section uses empirical analysis to show that corporate 
taxes reduce wages and that the magnitude of the negative relationship 
between the taxes and wages has increased over the past 30 years. The 
analysis also finds that state corporate taxes have a larger negative effect 
on more highly educated workers. 
I. HOW DO STATES TAX CORPORATIONS?
State corporate taxes were designed in the first half of the 20th 
century. The objectives of those early forms of the tax continue to in-
fluence current state corporate tax policy and its structure. But today’s 
corporate tax programs continue to evolve, and their complexity makes 
it difficult to evaluate the impact of corporate income taxes.
The evolution of state corporate taxes
Taxing income had been tried several times in the new World, 
starting with the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1643. But no income 
tax was able to generate a substantial amount of revenue until 1911, 
when Wisconsin became the first state to levy a successful corporate 
income tax (Stark).1 The goal of Wisconsin policymakers was to dis-
tribute the tax burden more justly. At the time, the property tax was the 
main tax revenue source for states. Personal property was often difficult 
to assess, however, and much property escaped taxation. In addition, 
many high-salaried workers did not own much property, and many 
believed these workers were not paying their fair share of taxes. The 
corporate and individual income taxes sought to alleviate these prob-
lems (Kinsman).
The success of Wisconsin’s income tax soon led other states to 
adopt similar taxes. By 1930, 23 states had adopted a corporate in-
come tax, and within ten years 40 states were taxing corporate income 
(Brunori and Cordes). Today, nevada, Wyoming, and Washington are 
the only states that do not tax corporate income.2 Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  79
Over the past 40 years, states’ reliance on corporate tax revenue has 
varied (Chart 1). Overall, the share of total state tax revenues coming 
from the corporate tax peaked in 1980 at almost 10 percent. By 2002, 
the corporate tax share of total tax revenues had fallen to less than 5 
percent, a decline largely driven by competition among states vying for 
new businesses. The viability and importance of the state corporate tax 
seemed to be permanently declining. But during the last five years, the 
magnitude of the state corporate tax revenue has increased.
Structure of state corporate taxes today
On average, corporate tax revenues make up about 7 percent of to-
tal state tax revenues. But reliance on corporate taxes differs from state 
to state (Figure 1). In 2007, Hawaii collected the smallest share of state 
tax revenues from corporate taxes, about 2 percent.3 At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, Alaska and new Hampshire collected 24 and 27 
percent, respectively. Among the states that tax corporate income, the 
highest marginal tax rate ranged from 4.63 percent in Colorado to 12 
percent in Iowa (Figure 2).4
Chart 1
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STATE  CORPORATE  TAx  REVEnUE  SHARE  OF  TOTAL 
STATE TAx REVEnUES, 2007
Figure 2
HIGHEST MARGInAL STATE CORPORATE TAx RATES, 2009
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Source: Tax Foundation
note: South Dakota does not impose a corporate income tax on all corporations, but banks are required to pay a 6 
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The progressivity of the corporate income tax structure also varies. 
Today, 31 states tax corporate income at a flat rate. The remaining 16 
states have multiple tax brackets. In Alaska, for example, each of ten 
income tax brackets has a different marginal tax rate.
As corporations expand and become multistate operations, deter-
mining what profit is taxable becomes a major complication. In other 
words, states must decide what fraction of a company’s income was 
earned in their state and is therefore taxable. This apportionment focus-
es on three factors: company payroll, property, and sales. Corporations 
must report what fractions of their total payroll, property, and sales 
occur within each individual state. The states place a weight on each of 
these factors, and the weights differ from state to state. Most states ap-
portion corporate income in one of three ways: equal weights on each 
of the three factors (all receive 33.3 percent weight), double weight on 
the sales factor (payroll and property each receive a 25 percent weight 
and sales a 50 percent weight), or full weight on sales (sales receive 100 
percent).5 The trend in apportioning income has been to move toward 
a heavier weight on sales. By focusing on sales, policymakers hope to 
entice firms to locate in their state to create jobs (with a lower payroll 
weight) and build new facilities (with a lower property weight). 
Another  complication  of  taxing  multistate  corporations  is  that 
many corporations sell products in states where they do not have a 
physical presence, or nexus.6 If a corporation has sales in a state, but 
not nexus, that sales income would not be apportioned to any state for 
corporate tax purposes. Almost half of states impose a throwback rule, 
however, which allows the state where the corporation is domiciled to 
claim this untaxed sales income for tax purposes. 
There are also other related complications. States must determine 
what they will use for a tax base. Most states use the federal corporate 
taxable income as their base.7 Some states allow deductions for depreci-
ation, federal taxes, foreign taxes, compensation expenses, and the cost 
of goods sold. In addition, some states allow corporations to apply the 
current year’s operating loss to taxable profits in previous or future years 
(called loss carryback or carryforward). This policy reduces the corpora-
tion’s tax liability. The number of years and the amount of the loss that 
can be carried forward or back vary among states. Many states offer tax 
credits for job creation, research and development, and investment. In 82  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
a number of states, income brackets are indexed for inflation. Six states 
impose a corporate alternative minimum tax (Barro). 
Other state taxes can also affect corporations. Seven states impose 
a gross receipts tax, which taxes corporations based on their gross rev-
enues rather than profits (Barro). Individual income taxes, sales taxes, 
property taxes, franchise taxes, and unemployment insurance taxes also 
affect the corporate bottom line. 
II.  WHO PAYS FOR CORPORATE TAXES?
Corporations are responsible for remitting corporate taxes to the 
state, but the actual burden of the state corporate tax falls elsewhere—on 
shareholders, consumers, workers, or some combination of the three.
Corporate and noncorporate shareholders
Many believe that shareholders, or owners of capital, bear the bur-
den of the corporate income tax. These corporate shareholders will pay 
the corporate tax in the form of lower profits if corporations are unable 
to shift the burden of the tax. However, it is not just owners of corpo-
rate capital who may bear the burden. 
In 1962, Harberger theorized that in a closed economy the burden 
of the federal corporate tax would be shared entirely by both corporate 
and noncorporate capital owners. If capital in the corporate sector is 
taxed, the after-tax return to capital in the corporate sector will de-
crease. Capital will move to the noncorporate sector in pursuit of high-
er returns until the after-tax returns have equalized across the corporate 
and noncorporate sectors. This increase in capital in the noncorporate 
sector will decrease the marginal productivity of capital in that sector, 
resulting in a lower return. Similarly, as capital leaves the corporate sec-
tor, the marginal productivity of capital in that sector will rise. Labor 
can move between sectors to ensure that wages will not change due to 
changes in the amount of capital. Thus, the burden of the corporate tax 
falls entirely on capital in both the corporate and noncorporate sectors 
in a closed economy (an economy without trade).
Many economists believe that the corporate tax burden shifts at 
least partly to other factors of production. But many still assume that 
capital bears the entire burden of the tax. The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury and the Congressional Budget Office both use this assump-Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  83
tion when assessing the distributional impact of taxes at the federal level 
(Cronin). The uncertainty of who bears the burden of the corporate tax 
led the Joint Committee on Taxation to ignore the corporate tax when 
calculating its distributional analyses.8  
Consumers
Consumers may also bear some of the burden of the state corporate 
tax in the form of higher prices for products and services. Many argue 
that corporate taxes essentially raise the cost of production for corpo-
rations and that corporations in turn raise prices to compensate for 
that additional cost. Economists disagree on whether corporations raise 
prices in response to corporate taxes, however, and empirical research 
has not settled the question. 
One economic theory states that because corporate income taxes are 
assessed on profits and not revenues, the corporate income tax should 
not affect production levels or prices of goods in the short run (Goode). 
Others argue, however, that the corporate income tax is assessed on 
normal profits (as opposed to pure profits) and therefore, corporations 
will raise prices to compensate for higher corporate income taxes.9 
Prices of corporate goods may also increase because a tax on corpo-
rations results in a smaller corporate sector and a larger noncorporate 
sector.10 This reallocation of capital from the corporate to noncorporate 
sector has the effect of decreasing the number of corporate goods and 
increasing the number of noncorporate goods. This change in quantity 
causes the price of corporate goods to increase relative to the price of 
noncorporate goods (Blinder).
Workers
The most recent economic research suggests that labor bears the 
majority of the corporate tax burden at the national level.11 In response 
to higher state corporate tax rates, corporations may lower wages, there-
by passing the burden onto workers. 
Corporations use capital and labor to produce goods and ser-
vices. In a competitive market, the return to capital is equal to the 
marginal productivity of capital, and the wage is equal to the marginal 
productivity of labor. In the United States, capital is mobile, and this 
capital mobility ensures that the return to capital will be equal across 84  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
states. Therefore, if a tax on capital is levied in one state, it cannot affect 
the return to capital, as shown below.12
Return to Capital = (1-τ ) * Marginal Productivity of Capital
If the tax on capital (τ) is increased, the marginal productivity of capital 
must increase to keep the return to capital the same as could be earned 
in other states. This occurs as capital flees the state in pursuit of a higher 
return. The decrease in capital will increase the marginal productivity of 
capital in the home state, and investors will continue to pursue outside 
opportunities until the marginal productivity of capital has increased to 
the point where the above equation holds. 
Thus, the state corporate tax encourages capital to depart the state, 
leaving workers in that state with less capital to use. With less capital, 
workers are less productive (that is, the marginal productivity of labor 
declines) and therefore earn lower wages. In this way, a tax on capital 
can be borne entirely by labor in an open economy.13 
The burden of the state corporate tax may differ among workers, 
especially across education levels. Additional capital increases the pro-
ductivity of high-skilled (or educated) workers more than less-skilled 
workers.14 For example, highly educated workers often use technology 
to perform their jobs. For many of these workers, having access to the 
newest technology makes them more productive. As capital leaves a 
state in response to higher corporate taxes, this may hurt the productiv-
ity of high-skilled workers more than low-skilled workers.
Past research: Does labor bear the burden?
Most of the economic literature examining the impact of corporate 
taxes on wages has focused on national corporate tax rates. Using a 
theoretical model, labor’s burden from the corporate tax is predicted to 
be 2 to 2.5 times as large as the tax revenue collected in an open econ-
omy (Harberger 1995). Several recent studies use empirical analysis to 
determine the effect of national corporate taxes on wages.15 Research on 
manufacturing firms found that wages fall 1 percent in response to a 1 
percent increase in the corporate tax rate (Hassett and Mathur). Similar 
research on firms in general found that a one-percentage-point increase 
in the corporate tax rate decreases wages by 0.7 percent (Felix). A study 
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found that in the long run, labor bears close to 100 percent of the cor-
porate tax burden (Arulampalam, Devereux and Maffini). All of these 
studies used different data and methodologies—yet they all concluded 
that labor bears a substantial burden of the national corporate tax. 
The empirical economic literature on the effects of state corporate 
taxes has also found strong evidence of corporate taxes shifting toward 
labor. One study using 1980 data on wages from 125 U.S. cities found 
that a one-percentage-point increase in the state corporate tax rate re-
duces annual wages by about 1 percent (Gyourko and Tracy). 
The next section of this article seeks to update and extend the   
Gyourko and Tracy analysis in several ways.16 First, by using 29 years of 
data, spanning 1977 to 2005, the current analysis is able to identify the 
more recent effects of state corporate taxes on wages and analyze how 
the burden on labor has changed over time. In addition, this article 
examines the effect of corporate taxes across different education groups 
to help explain the distribution of the state corporate tax burden.
III.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  STATE  CORPORATE  TAXES 
ON WAGES
Empirical analysis shows that corporate taxes reduce wages, and the 
magnitude of this effect increases over time. The results also find that 
high-skilled workers bear a larger burden from the corporate income 
tax than low-skilled workers. 
Measuring the effect of corporate taxes on wages
A simple regression model shows that an individual’s wage depends 
on state taxes, individual traits, and state characteristics.17 In other 
words, the regression model allows us to estimate the impact of state 
corporate taxes on wages, while controlling for other factors that also 
influence the wage rate.
ln(wage) =a + b(Tax variables) +d (individual Characteristics)
      + g (State Characteristics) + e
The basis of the data is individual-level data from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey and covers the years 1977 to 2005.18 The dependent 
variable in all of the regressions is the individual wage rate, adjusted 
for inflation.19,20 Many individual characteristics affect wages, includ-86  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
ing educational attainment.21 Vast economic literature has shown that 
additional schooling increases wages. But to date, no studies have in-
vestigated how state corporate taxes influence wages of workers with 
different educational levels.22,23 This analysis divides individuals into 
three groups: those with less than a high school diploma, those with 
a high school diploma but without a college degree, and those with at 
least a bachelor’s degree.24 
As discussed in the previous section, state-level corporate tax rates are 
likely to have a negative impact on wages, but other state taxes are also 
likely to have an effect.25 One difficulty that arises in economic tax re-
search is choosing the correct tax rate to use in the analysis.26 The regres-
sions in this analysis use the highest marginal corporate tax rate because 
this is the most reliable state corporate tax rate available.27 
State-level characteristics may also affect wages. Workers might be 
willing to accept lower wages if states offer desirable amenities. Con-
versely, employers might offer higher wages to attract workers to less-
desirable locations.28 In addition to collecting taxes, states provide public 
goods and services, which may also attract workers and affect wages.29 
How much do state corporate taxes lower wages?
The hypothesis that state corporate tax rates have a negative ef-
fect on wages is confirmed in Table 1. Column 1 shows the results 
from regressing the wage rate on tax rates, as well as on individual and 
state variables. Column 2 adds controls for three weather-related fac-
tors, while column 3 adds controls for three measures of government 
services.30
As expected, the marginal state corporate tax rate has a negative 
effect on wages. The coefficient on the state corporate tax rate is sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level in all three regressions. A one-percentage-
point increase in the marginal state corporate tax rate reduces wages 
0.14 to 0.36 percent. This is a sizable effect, but smaller than the effect 
found by Gyourko and Tracy. Part of this difference may be explained 
by the fact that Gyourko and Tracy looked at annual wages and thus 
picked up changes in wage and employment.31 
The results in the first two columns show that companies in states 
with higher individual income tax rates do pay higher wages.32 This 
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of the individual income tax onto other factors. The coefficients on the 
state sales tax imply that increases in the sales tax rate slightly reduce 
wages. This indicates that consumers are not able to pass along the bur-
den of the sales tax to their employers. The individual characteristics of 
workers affect wages as expected.33 
The effect of state corporate taxes over time 
To see how the burden of state corporate taxes has changed over time, 
the regression from Table 1, column 1 is duplicated for each five-year 
time period since 1977 (Appendix Table A2).34  The state corporate tax 
rate has a significant and negative effect on wages in every time period as 
shown in Chart 2. In response to a one-percentage-point increase in the 
state corporate tax rate, wages fell between 0.22 and 0.67 percent. 
Table 1
THE EFFECT OF STATE CORPORATE TAxES On WAGES
(Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage Rate))
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.39 *** 1.41*** 1.41***
Highest Marginal State Corporate Tax Rate -.36 *** -.14 *** -.17 ***
Marginal State Individual Income Tax Rate .25 *** .06 ** -.04
State Sales Tax Rate -.02 -.09 * -.10 *
Age .05 *** .05 *** .05 ***
Age Squared .00 *** .00 *** .00 ***
Dummy for Male .25 *** .25 *** .26 ***
Dummy for Married .11 *** .11 *** .11 ***
Dummy for White .07 *** .07 *** .06 ***
Dummy for Metro Area .14 *** .14 *** .13 ***
Dummy for Less Than High School Diploma -.46 *** -.46 *** -.46 ***
Dummy for High School Diploma or Some College -.25 *** -.25 *** -.25 ***
Dummy for Occupation yes yes yes
Dummy for Industries yes yes yes
Dummy for year yes yes yes
Dummy for Census Division yes yes yes
Weather no yes yes
Government Services no no yes
R-Squared 39.63% 39.67% 39.56%
number of Individuals 1,150,966 1,150,966 874,826
note: The statistical significance for the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.88  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
Although the effect of state corporate taxes on wages has fluctuated 
over time, the magnitude of the effect trended upward from 1977 to 
2005. Between 1977 and 1991, a one-percentage-point increase in the 
state corporate tax rate reduced wages 0.27 percent, on average. In com-
parison, from 1992 to 2005, a one-percentage-point increase in the state 
corporate tax rate decreased wages 0.52 percent, on average. This jump 
may be due in part to increasing global competition. In 1977, total trade 
(exports plus imports) in the United States amounted to almost 17 per-
cent of GDP. By 2005, this number had increased to over 30 percent. 
This jump in global trade suggests that the after-tax return to capital must 
be equalized, not only among states, but also across countries.
Another possible explanation for the additional burden on labor 
from the state corporate tax is the increasing competition among states 
to attract businesses. Over the past 30 years, businesses have become 
more mobile, and thus states have intensified their efforts to attract 
companies (Farrell). During this time period, the average number of 
state incentive programs more than doubled and recruitment subsidies 
increased (Farrell). As states offer more and more to attract businesses, 
corporations may have become even more responsive to state corporate 
chart 2





















note: This chart shows the decline in wage rates as a result of a one-percentage-point increase in the state corporate 
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income taxes. According to a KPMG report, improvements in transpor-
tation, communication and trade have made it easier for corporations to 
base their location decisions on places that offer the “best combination 
of price and value” (Wunder).
The effect of state corporate taxes by education group
  Knowing that some of the state corporate tax burden is passed onto 
labor is only part of understanding the progressivity of state corporate 
income taxes. It is also important to know how corporate taxes affect 
workers with different educational or skill levels. Appendix Table A3 
shows regression results for each education group. The state corporate 
tax rate has a significant and negative effect on the wages of each educa-
tion group (Chart 3). 
The state corporate tax rate has a larger effect on wages as educa-
tion levels increase. A one-percentage-point increase in the marginal 
state corporate tax rate reduces the wages of college-educated (or higher) 
workers 0.44 percent, high-school educated (or some college) workers 
0.31 percent, and workers without a high school diploma 0.26 percent. 
chart 3
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Thus, when some capital leaves a state in response to higher corporate 
taxes, the most highly skilled workers experience the largest decline in 
productivity and thus the largest decline in wages. 
This result suggests that the burden of the state corporate income 
tax is progressive. In other words, the tax burden as a percent of income 
is higher for higher-income workers. Still, all workers bear some of the 
corporate tax burden. Therefore, the state corporate tax is less progressive 
than it would be if the burden fell solely on shareholders. 
In addition to helping explain the progressivity of the state corporate 
income tax, the fact that highly educated workers bear a larger share of 
the corporate tax burden may have implications for the attraction and 
retention of such workers. By reducing the wages of highly educated 
workers, state corporate taxes may reduce the number of highly educated 
workers that choose to locate in a given state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The incidence of a tax does not always fall on those responsible for 
remitting the tax. In the case of the state corporate income tax, labor 
bears a significant burden from the tax in the form of lower wages. 
Regression analysis shows that a one-percentage-point increase in the 
marginal state corporate tax rate reduces wages 0.14 to 0.36 percent. 
Labor’s burden from the state corporate tax has trended upward over 
time. In the 1990s and early 2000s, wages began falling more in re-
sponse to higher corporate tax rates than in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
This result may be explained by increased global competition and in-
creased competition among states to attract businesses.
State corporate taxes reduce the wages of highly educated work-
ers by a larger percentage than less-educated workers. This difference is 
consistent with the view that additional capital increases the productiv-
ity of highly skilled labor more than that of lower-skilled workers. This 
finding is important because, as the burden of the corporate tax has 
shifted to labor, some of the tax’s progressivity remains. Because the state 
corporate tax has a negative effect on the wages of all education groups, 
however, the tax is likely less progressive than originally thought.
A separate question arises as state corporate income taxes create incen-
tives for corporations and individuals to change their behavior to avoid 
taxes. Do these behavioral changes create inefficiencies? The answer is Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  91
yes, for several reasons. A corporate tax creates an inefficient allocation of 
capital between corporate and noncorporate firms within a state. In ad-
dition, the mobility of capital leads to an inefficient allocation of capital 
among states, as capital flees states that impose higher corporate taxes. 
Finally, because state corporate taxes reduce wages, they may also influ-
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EnDnOTES
1Wisconsin enacted an individual income tax at the same time.
2Texas does not have a corporate income tax but does impose a gross re-
ceipts tax on corporations. This tax acts as a corporate income tax but taxes gross 
receipts as opposed to profits.
3Hawaii collected the smallest share of state tax revenues among states that 
impose a state corporate income tax.
4Appendix Table A1 presents corporate tax rates and structure characteris-
tics for each state.
5The current apportionment weights are presented for each state in Ap-
pendix Table A1.
6nexus requires sufficient physical presence.  Determining if a corporation 
has nexus is a complicated legal issue.
7The Tax Foundation’s State Business Tax Climate Index provides more in-
formation about the corporate tax structure of individual states.
8This fact was noted by Cronin and can be found in a 1997 document pub-
lished by the Joint Committee on Taxation (in footnote 3 from JCx-41-97).
9Auld and Miller provide an explanation of this argument.
10This is a result of the Harberger model (Blinder).
11Gentry provides a summary of this literature.
12A tax in one state cannot affect the return to capital as long as the state is 
sufficiently small. 
13This argument assumes that labor is at least partially immobile.
14Griliches finds that skilled labor is more complementary with capital than 
unskilled labor.
15Gentry provides an overview of these recent contributions, including Aru-
lampalam, Devereax and Maffini; Felix; and Hassett and Mathur.
16Gyourko and Tracy focused on city-level variation. This article uses varia-
tion at the state level. There are other minor differences to the empirical analysis, 
but the overall approach is similar.
17The regression used in this article is similar in form to the regressions used 
by Gyourko and Tracy.
18This data is available from IPUMS.
19The individual wage rate is calculated using the annual salary divided by the 
number of hours worked per week and the number of weeks worked per year.
20Some studies have used the annual wage; however, this would pick up 
the effects of the corporate tax on both employment and wages. The effects on 
employment and wages are both interesting questions. However, the focus of 
this paper is on wages.
21In addition to educational attainment, an individual’s age, age-squared, 
gender, race, and marital status affect wages. Wages also increase as individuals 
gain experience. Wages tend to grow more quickly at the beginning of careers Economic REviEw • SEcond quaRtER 2009  99
than toward the end. The number of years of experience is not available in the 
data, so age is used to approximate experience. In addition, an age-squared term 
is included to account for the expected decline in the pace of wage increases later 
in a career. Studies have found that males tend to make more than females, and 
whites usually make more than non-whites, holding all else constant. The occu-
pation and industry of an individual also influences wages. Workers who live in 
metropolitan areas usually earn higher wages to compensate for the higher cost 
of living.
22Card provides a detailed summary of this literature.
23Felix examines the effects of national corporate income tax rates on workers 
of different education levels.
24These individuals are classified as having a low education, middle education 
or high education, respectively.
25If workers are able to avoid some of the burden of the personal income tax, 
wages would be higher in states with higher personal income tax rates. If workers 
do not bear the full burden of the individual income tax, they must earn higher 
wages pre-tax so that after-tax wages fall by less than the full amount of the tax.   
Also, if consumers do not bear the full burden of sales taxes, wages would be 
higher in states with higher sales tax rates.
26For state corporate taxes, it is the marginal effective corporate tax rate that 
impacts wages. Unfortunately, the complexity of corporate tax structures prevents 
good data from existing on this rate. 
27The highest marginal corporate tax rate is available in the World Tax Data-
base provided by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. 
Since most states have top brackets that start at fairly low levels of profit, it is a 
good approximate to the desired rate (Gyourko and Tracy). However, this rate 
does not account for differences in the corporate tax base that are influenced by 
apportionment weights, deductions and credits. The marginal state individual 
income tax rate is calculated for each individual by using the average national 
wage within an education group. This tax rate was calculated using TAxSIM, 
which is available from the national Bureau of Economic Research. The average 
national wage was calculated for each education group in each year. This wage was 
submitted to TAxSIM for each state. Therefore, the individual income tax rate 
varies by state, year, and education. The average national wage was used instead of 
the individual wage to avoid endogeneity problems. The general sales tax rate is 
widely available and was obtained from the World Tax Database.
28It is impossible to control for all of the amenities available in each state, and 
in addition, preferences for various amenities may differ across individuals. Still, 
it is important to include several variables in the regression to attempt to control 
for differences across states. One big attraction or deterrent for many individuals 
is weather. Therefore, some of the regressions look at the impact of warm weather, 
cold weather, and the number of days with precipitation.100  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
29Education is one service that is highly valued by many individuals. It is diffi-
cult to measure the quality of education, but one rough indicator is the student-to-
teacher ratio. Other desirable features include low crime rates and good hospitals. 
The quality of hospitals is also difficult to measure. In the regressions, the number 
of physicians per 100,000 civilian population is used.
30The student-to-teacher ratio and the physician rate are not available for all 
years in the data. Therefore, the number of observations is lower in Column 3 
than in the first two columns.
31The empirical framework in this paper is similar to that used by Gyourko 
and Tracy. However, there are a couple of key differences. First, they focused on 
wages within cities and therefore eliminated individuals who did not live in one of 
125 cities. Second, their data consisted of one year, 1980. This article gains some 
variation in the tax rates over time by looking at data from 1977 to 2005. 
32The coefficient on the state marginal individual income tax rate is negative 
in column 3,  but the result is not significant at the 10 percent level.
33After controlling for other factors, wages are shown to increase with age. In 
addition, men earn about 25 percent more than women, whites earn 7 percent 
more than non-whites, and married workers earn 11 percent more than single 
workers. Individuals with a high school diploma or some college are estimated to 
earn 25 percent less than college graduates, and individuals with less than a high 
school diploma earn 46 percent less than college graduates. Workers living in a 
metropolitan area also earn about 14 percent more than those living outside these 
areas. One reason for this disparity is the difference in the cost of living.
34The last grouping is a four-year time period.
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